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TOWARD UNDERSTANDING UNLAWFUL
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
.Diane Vaughan*

The emergence and growth of regulatory agencies charged with
controlling organizational misconduct has been so widespread that
the monitoring and regulation of corporate interactions has itself become "big business," with the complexity of the regulatory agencies
at times matching or even exceeding that of the organizations they
regulate. The effectiveness of these efforts to control unlawful
organizational behavior has been assessed in many different ways.
The records of agency investigations, administrative hearings, and
judicial proceedings provide data on enforcement actions, court decrees, trials, convictions, penalties, and other indicators that allow
empirical estimates to be made. A realistic assessment of agency efforts, however, must go beyond public records and recognize that all
social control efforts encounter natural constraints because of the
ways in which the social structure continuously and systematically
generates unlawful organizational behavior.I
• Visiting Fellow, Department of Sociology, Yale University. B.A. 1973, M.A. 1974,
Ph.D., 1979, The Ohio State University. - Ed.
The research for this Article was conducted under grant number 2 T32 MH15123 from the
National Institute of Mental Health. I thank Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and the post-doctoral seminar
on the Sociology of Social Control, Kai T. Erikson and the writing seminar, and Patricia M.
Ewick for their comments on earlier versions of these ideas.
1. Since the early 1970s, research advances and theoretical efforts concerning the unlawful
behavior of organizations have increasingly considered the organization as the unit of analysis
and have recognized the importance of social structure-in explaining unlawful behavior. The
body of work that is emerging follows the holistic model suggested by organizational theorists,
who note the importance of studying not only the organization, but also the environment in
which it exists. See, e.g., H. ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS (1979); J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS (1978); Emery & Trist,
The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments, 18 HUMAN REL. 21 (1965); Evan, The
Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations, in APPROACHES TO ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 173 (J. Thompson ed. 1966). Theoretical development is occurring,
(see, e.g., CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE (M. Ermann & R. Lundman eds.
1978); Schrager & Short, Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime, 25 Soc. PROB. 407
(1978)), but most efforts have been directed toward empirically testing selected variables that
may predict unlawful organizational behavior: firm size, financial performance, diversification, market power, industrial concentration, and the interdependence of industry and government. See M. CLINARD, P. YEAGER, J. BRISSETTE, D. PETRASHEK & E. HARRIES, ILLEGAL
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1979); J. PEREZ, CORPORATE CRIMINALITY (1978); Asch & Seneca, Is
Collusion Profitable?, 58 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 1 (1976); Staw & Szwajkowski, The Scarcity-Mun!ficence Component of Organizational Environments and the Commission of Illegal
Acts, 20 AD. Ser. Q. 345 (1975). An overall evaluation of these attempts to examine structural
factors that contribute to unlawful organizational behavior would be premature. A summary
description, however, is not out of order. Many variables suggested in the literature have not
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By social structure, I mean two things. First, the stable characteristics in American society that form the environment in which organizations conduct their business activities: sets of social relations,
' laws, norms, groups, and institutions. Second, the stable characteristics of organizations themselves: internal structure and processes.
These factors produce tensions for organizations to attain goals unlawfully. Although not all organizations experiencing these tensions
will respond with misconduct, this Article seeks to open lines of inquiry by presenting the relationship between structural factors .and
unlawful behavior as a general model. While applicable to the unlawful behavior of organizations other than those engaged in private
enterprise, this explication focuses on profit-seeking complex organizations in the legitimate economic order because these organizations
present the strongest example.

I. THE

STRUCTURAL IMPETUS

The idea that the social structure generates the motivation for
individuals to engage in deviance was suggested by Robert Merton.2
The concepts central to his thesis are competition, economic success
as a culturally approved goal, and erosion of norms supporting legitimate procedures for achieving it.3 Because Merton concluded that
these factors differentially affect the lower class, empirical assessment of his ideas has been restricted to individual behavior. But the
concepts that he identified in many ways seem more appropriate for
understanding rates of misconduct among organizations than among
yet been tested, and those that have been studied exhibit wide variability in industry, violations, enforcing agency, organizational characteristics, and environmental factors examined,
Methodological limitations have also plagued researchers: sampling is limited to enforcement
actions, and operational definitions do not have proven construct validity. Because of these
complicating factors, findings are noncomparable. Nevertheless, one fact is clear: Sociologists
are creating the tools necessary for understanding the unlawful behavior of organizations as a
macro-phenomenon. For an analysis of this trend, see Vaughan, Recent J)eve/opmenls in
"White-Collar Crime" Theory and Research, in THE MAD, THE BAD, AND THE DJFFERl!NT!
EssAYS IN HONOR OF SJMON DINrrz 135 (I. Barak-Glantz & C. Hu.If eds. 1981).
2. R. MERTON, Social Structure andAnomie, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SocJAL STRUCTURE
185 (1968).
3. More specifically, Merton suggested that the interplay between the cultural structure
and the social structure plays a critical role in the production of deviance. He focused on two
elements of the cultural structure: (1) culturally defined goals (ends) that are held out and
accepted as legitimate objectives for all members of a society, and (2) norms that specify the
allowable procedures (means) for attaining these objectives. When the achievement of the desired goals receives strong cultural emphasis, while much less emphasis is placed on the norms
regulating the means, these norms will tend to lose their power to regulate behavior. A state of
anomie (normlessness) develops. Given the culturally induced motivation to succeed and the
decreased effectiveness of norms, the pursuit of desired goals by illegitimate means may be one
response. Id. at 186-89.
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individuals.4
Though organizations have many goals, economic success is imperative for organizational survival. In fact, organizations must seek
profits regardless of variability in the values of a particular ~ulture. 5
Not only is economic success critical to survival in the corporate
world, but organizational wealth is also an indicator of prestige. The
annual puolication of Fortune's "Five Hundred"6 indicates membership in the upper class of the organizational stratification system.
How organizations are ranked within this stratification system is
monitored through quarterly reports, earnings, dividends, and stock
market transactions. The key to social mobility within the system is
profit-maximization.7
Economists disagree, however, about the primacy of profit maximization as a goal for business firms. Professor Scherer has summarized these challenges to the profit-maximization hypothesis,
dividing them into three categories: the effects of uncertainty, the
complexity of organizations, and the multitude of managerial goals. 8
The effects of uncertainty may inhibit profit-maximization because
managers lack the information necessary to formulate definite expectations about future values that will shape profit-maximization decision rules. 9 Organizational complexity may inhibit profitmaximization because division of labor, hierarchy, and information
blockages may limit the organization's ability to enforce management choices that coincide with profit goals. Finally, organizations
may choose to pursue other objectives in addition to, or instead of,
profits -preferences for growth, stability, maximum sales, perqui4. The precise relationship between Merton's concepts and the ideas presented here is elaborated in D. VAUGHAN, ON THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS ch. 4 (1983)
(forthcoming).
5. See Lemert, Social Structure, Social Control and Deviation, in ANOMIE AND DEVIANT
BEHAVIOR 57, 62-66 (M. Clinard ed. 1964) (critiquing Merton's assumption of uniform values
for individuals).
6. The Fortune Directory of the Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE May 3,
1982 at 258.
1. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); Coffee, "No Soul To
Damn: No Body To Kick'!· An Unscandalized IntJUiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 19 MICH. L. REv. 386,395 (1981) (''the economist assumes that firms universally seek to
maximize profits").
·
8. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 29-37
(2d ed. 1980).
9. Herbert Sinton has argued that because the firm lacks perfect knowledge, it must examine alternative strategies sequentially. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY
OF THE FIRM 10 (1963). The process is largely environmentally conditioned - the most obvious or available alternatives are examined first, and managers may end their search when they
obtain a satisfactory answer that meets their basic criteria. See J. MARcH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 113-17, 138-42, 169-71 (1958).
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sites, or the proliferation of management itself. 10 Because other goals
may constrain decision-making, organizations may "satisfice," or decide to obtain a minimum level of profits, share of the market, or
level of sales. 11
These alternative speculations concerning the competition for
profits, however, do not seriously undermine the primacy of profit
maximization. After reviewing the available evidence, Scherer
concluded:
When forced into the trenches on the question of whether firms maximize profits, economists resort to the ultimate weapon in their arsenal:
a variant of Darwin's natural selection theory. Over the long pull,
there is one simple criterion for the survival of a business enterprise:
Profits must be nonnegative. No matter how strongly managers prefer
to pursue other objectives, and no matter how difficult it is to find
profit-maximizing strategies in a world of uncertainty and high information costs, failure to satisfy this criterion means ultimately that a
firm will disappear from the economic scene. Profit-maximization is
therefore promoted in two ways. First, firms departing too far from the
optimum, either deliberately or by mistake, will disappear. Only those
that do conform, knowingly or unknowingly, will survive. If the process of economic selection is allowed to continue long enough, the only
survivors will be firms that did a tolerably good job of profit maximization. The economic environment adopts the profit-maximizers and
discards the rest. Second, knowledge that only the fit will survive provides a potential incentive for all firms to adapt their behavior in
profit-maximizing directions, learning whatever skills they need and
emulating organizations that succeed in the survival game. 12

While firms may seek power, prestige, or a myriad of other goals,
they must obtain the economic resources necessary for continued operation. This Article will, therefore, take as valid the assumption
that profit-maximization (the adjustment of output in the face of
market conditions so that the firm can maximize revenues over costs)
is a motivating goal and a central activity of complex organizations.
Financial success is a goal held out to be attained by all, but
profit-seeking organizations must compete to attain it. 13 They compete not only for economic goals, but ·a1so for the resources that promote achievement of economic ends: personnel recruitment, product
development, land acquisition, advertising space, and sales territory.
10. See Kamerschen, The Economic Effects of Monopoly: A Lawyer's Guide to Antitrust
Economics, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 20, 28-32 (f. Calvani & Siegfried
eds. 1979).
11. The classic works on "satisficing" behavior are J. MARCH & H. SIMON, supra note 9,
and R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 9. For an account of profit satisficing, see Coffee, supra
.note 7, at 395-96.
12. _F. SCHERER, supra note 8, at 38.
13. q: R. MERTON, supra note 2, at 188 (discussing competition between individuals).
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An organization's ability to obtain requisite resources may be con-

strained by the source, nature, and abundance of the resource, by the
behavior of other organizations in the environment in the roles of
consumers, suppliers, competitors, and controllers, 14 by individuals
in the role of consumers, 15 and by the resources already possessed by
the organization and preexisting demands on those resources. As a
result, attainment of economic goals may be obstructed in two ways.
First, an organization may be entirely excluded from the competition
(e.g., market entry is prohibited by controllers; resources are unavailable to devote to product development). Second, an organization might gain entry to the competition, but remain unable to attain
its economic goals because supplies of the resources that represent
the goals (e.g., government contracts, customers for a particular
product) are limited. Profit-seeking organizations, therefore, must
compete for both economic goals and the means to those goals. The
availability of both can be limited, moreover, not only by insufficient
supply, but also by the inability or unwillingness to obtain a commodity at a given price. Thus, some scarcity can always exist. And
when the scarcity of strategic resources threatens an organization
with possible loss in legitimate competition, unlawful conduct may
result.
The likelihood that an organization will act unlawfully is not, of
course, determined solely by the availability of strategic resources.
The effect of goal variability on the competition must also be considered. All organizations must maximize returns over costs to survive,
but the more general goal of economic success will be reflected in
differential standards in particular organizations. Economic success
is relative and an organization's criteria for success are shaped by
both financial conditions and by the other organizations with which
it must compete. Standards for economic success reflect position in
the organizational stratification system, and may take three forms: 16
(1) A shift in economic and social position; higher status
competitors.
(2) A shift in economic position; higher status among same
competitors.
(3) Maintenance of existing economic and social position.
For organizations already among the elite, an upward shift in social
14. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note I, at 39-59.
15. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 4, 21-54 (1970).
16. These standards for organizational success are based on the standards that Cloward
and Ohlin presented for individuals. See R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY 94-95 (1960).
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position may not be possible, though higher economic status within
the same membership group may be. Organizations not among the
elite may, at varying times, be concerned with all three standards for
success. And all organizations, regardless of rank, must seek to
maintain their existing economic and social position. To fail to
maintain that position is to succumb to downward mobility. Consequently, scarcity, combined with the differential standards for economic success, raises the possibility of blocked access to resources
regardless of an organization's size, wealth, age, experience, or previous record

Economic goals vary in a second important way as well. Competitive pressures and the cultural emphasis on economic success
typically lead organizations to establish new goals once one is
achieved. A "maximum" profit, in the literal sense, becomes an infinitely receding possibility under these circumstances. Motivational
tensions continue to operate, reinforcing the pursuit of success.
Should a goal be attained, a new one is set, continually recreating the
possibility of blocked access to resources and the consequent tensions to attain them unlawfully.
Unlawful conduct is most likely to be chosen as a survival strategy when support diminishes for legitimate procedures for reaching
desired goals. The erosion of normative support for legitimate conduct among organizations has been noted in the stratification systems of societies that become modernized. 17 The importance of
family lineage as the basis of rank declines, while the rankings of
organizations relative to one another become increasingly important.
Organizational membership becomes an indicator of individual
prestige. In this way, individuals' mobility becomes linked to improving the position of their organization relative to other organizations. In a society that is not experiencing major structural
reorganization, the norms governing competition for rank among organizations usually obtain consensus. When modernization is underway, however, the established stratification principles are
inappropriate. The units to be ranked are organizations, not families, and the ranking process is further complicated by the rapid mul-.
tiplication of organizations. Consensus is absent on the ranks of
organizations and how the ranks may legitimately be improved.
New organizations, moreover, tend to be led by new leaders, who
did not previously occupy elite positions. Because of youth and
17. See Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in
142, 169-80 (J. March ed. 1965).

TIONS
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rapid rise to wealth and prominence, these new leaders tend to be
"less committed to the norms of the system of stratification among
organizations." 18 Unsocialized by the old elite, their behavior is
guided by the principle that new organizations only rise rapidly if
they have some disrespect for traditional standards. 19 In a period of
rapid structural differentiation, "therefore, [wjhat is very generally at
stake is the definition of what is deviant." 20 Under these circumstances, the means of organizational competition become unlimited.
The characteristics attributed to modernizing societies continue
in highly modernized societies. Because some organizations cease to
exist and others are constantly being created, the ranking of organizations remains in flux. Organizational membership continues to be
a key element defining individual prestige. Perhaps most important,
the definition of deviance remains ambiguous,21 creating the possibility of a chronic state of anomie for all organizations, regardless of
rank in the strat!fication system. Successful achievement of organizational goals through unlawful conduct tends to reinforce the occurrence of this behavior, so that what the society defines as illegal may
come to be defined in the organization as normative. Choice is not
simply an output of structure, but a strategic input for the system as
a whole. 22 The successful become models for others in their environment who, initially less vulnerable and alienated, now no longer
keep to the rules that they once regarded as legitimate.23 Decisions
to use illegitimate methods to achieve desired goals thus feed back
into the social structure, effectively maintaining the pattern ''unless
counteracting mechanisms of social control are called into play."24
The "counteracting mechanisms of social control," however, operate at less than maximum effectiveness because administrative
rules and regulations and criminal and civil statutes that are directed
18. Id at 174.
19. Id
20. Id at 175 (emphasis added).
21. "On the top economic levels, the pressure toward innovation not infrequently erases
the distinction between busin~•like strivings this side of the mores and sharp practices beyond the mores." R. Merton, supra note 2, at 195. See also Geis, White Collar Crime: The
Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of1961, in CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS 139 (M.
Clinard & R. Quinney eds. 1967); Kramer, Corporate Crime: An Organizational Perspective
14 (Paper presented at the Conference on White-Collar and Economic Crime, Potsdam, N.Y.,
Feb. 7-9, 1980) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); CORPORATE AND GOVERNMEN·
TAL DEVIANCE, supra note 1.
22. Stinchcombe, Merton's Theory ofSocial Structure, in THE IDEA OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE
11, 23-24 (L. Coser ed. 1975).
23. R. Merton, Anomie, Anomia, and Social Interaction: Contexts of .Deviant Behavior in
ANOMIE AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR, supra note 5, at 235.
24. Id
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at organizational behavior do not revolve around sacred values - in
fact, in many cases represent no values of individuals - but instead
result from compromises reached between agencies or legislatures
and the firms that they regulate. 25 This situation arises because of
the interdependence of controllers and controlled. Interdependence
between two organizations means that outcomes for each are, in
part, determined by the activities of the other. 26 The outcomes they
reach are determined by the nature and distribution of resources between the two and the way in which the resources are used: Each has
the potential to interfere with the other's activities. 27 Both have a
vested interest in shaping a regulatory environment that enhances
their own survival. Hence, they act in ways that maximize use of
their resources to meet survival goals and minimize the other's ability to interfere with goal attainment. Since the information and
wealth possessed by organizations can create obstacles to enforcement activities, agencies frequently fulfill their responsibilities
through negotiation, internal proceedings, informal hearings, and
mutually agreeable solutions. And business firms, similarly concerned with successful operation, soften the power of agencies by
efforts to influence law-making and as a consequence, the nature of
enforcement, and :find equivalent gains to be had from negotiation.
Compliance emerges as a product of the power-mediating efforts of
both parties, as compliance demands fewer resources from both
agencies and business firms than do adversarial activities to impose
and thwart punitive sanctions.28 In any given case, of course, a firm
or agency may funnel all available resources into a full-fledged adversarial proceeding.29 But when this occurs, the event will take
place in a regulat?ry environment that has developed as a result of
25. Lemert, supra note 5, at 69.
26. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note I, at 40-54, 113-42.
21. Id
28. For a further explication of interdependence, with special attention to implications for
social control, see D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at ch. 6.
29. The recently settled IBM case provides one extreme example. See Gerhart, Corporate
Giantism and Effective Antitrust Enforcement (Paper presented at the American Society of
Criminology Annual Meetings, Philadelphia, Pa., Nov. 7-9, 1980) (on file with the Michigan
Law Review). Gerhart notes, for example, that during the first three and a half years of trial in
the monopoly case brought by the government against IBM,
the government presented fifty-one witnesses (one appearing for over a month), the trial
transcript totaled 84 thousand pages, and 211,000 pages of documents were received as
evidence. Equally prodigious work occurred before the trial even began. The parties took
over 1300 depositions. IBM is said to have produced over 65 million pages of documents
for review by the government and several private plaintiffs suing IBM, and the government produced approximately 26 million pages of documents for IBM's review, almost a
million of which were copied by IBM.
Id. at 5.
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the interdependence of controllers and controlled. The institutionalized guidelines - laws, regulations, sanctions, and proceedings have been shaped by the survival interests of both. And in many
cases, these guidelines will inhibit the efforts of agencies to restrain
unlawful organizational behavior in spite of their skills, resources,
and commitment to an adversarial stance.
Unlawful behavior thus receives additional structural support,
which aids in maintaining the pattern. The success of some organizations at attaining their goals unlawfully encourages others to follow the same path to success. 30 The absence of normative support
for legitimate conduct is replaced by normative support for the illegitimate, but expedient. Carried to the extreme, norm erosion might
become so extensive within an organization or subunit of an organization that unlawful conduct to attain goals occurs regardless of resource scarcity. Behavior that, if viewed by society, would be
considered unlawful may come to be considered acceptable business
practice and nondeviant within the organization.
As normative support for legitimate procedures for reaching organizational goals erodes, organizations motivated by the cultural
emphasis on economic success and the need to survive, and unable
to attain resources legitimately, may instead resort to technically expedient but unlawful behavior. Anticompetitive actions like pricefixing and discriminatory price-cutting, theft of trade secrets, false
advertising, and bribery and payoffs to ensure market share could
thus be described as the victimization of one organization by another
to obtain resources that facilitate upward mobility in the organizational stratification system.31 Similarly, organizations seeking eit~er
a change in economic position that will bring higher status among
similarly situated organizations, or merely to maintain their economic position may also act unlawfully under these circumstances.32
These concepts, of course, do not explain all unlawful organizational behavior. As presented here, they are directed toward understanding the unlawful activities of profit-seeking complex
organizations in the legitimate economic order.33 The concepts fit
30. R. Merton, supra note 23, at 235; Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 23-24.
31. See Levine, Empiricism in Victimological Research: A Critique, 3 VICTIMOLOGY 77, 88
(1978).
32. See R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, supra note 16, at 94-95.
33. I suggested earlier, however, that the applicability of these concepts is not restricted to
profit-seeking business organizations. A brief discussion at this point is worthwhile to demonstrate how other organizations may or may not be included. Three types of complex organizations come to mind: {I) organizations designed to fail; (2) nonprofit organizations; and (3)
organizations operating in the illegitimate economic order - organized crime.
Organizations designed to fail: Not all organizations seek profits. Some, in fact, are
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the activities of organizations that violate the law in pursuit of culturally approved goals, broadly defined as economic success. This
criterion excludes behavior that is not directed toward maximizing
returns, such as violations resulting from mistakes.34 A law or regulation may be violated because it is misunderstood, or because its
existence is unknown. For other violations, such as sex discrimination in hiring, the linkage between the violation and profit-making
remains a matter of empirical inquiry. Consider also violations that
result from negligence. Because business firms do take risks in the
name of profit, negligence may occur as a result of profit-seeking
activity. If it can be determined that a firm negligently allocated resources to maximize profits at the expense of proper attention to
some task, the concepts would be relevant to the organization's behavior. In this and similar situations, the inability to make the necessary empirical determinations may be a serious impediment.
Nevertheless, current opinion on the link between .objectives, regardless of diversity, and the need for organizations to maximize returns
designed to accumulate losses, rather than profits. The individual owner or owners receive
benefits, while the organization is the center of transactions and losses. See Shapiro, Detecting
illegalities: A Perspective on the Control of Securities Violations 259 (1980) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Yale University). These organizations obviously do not fit a motivational scheme based on competition to acquire resources in order to survive.
Nonprofit Organizations: Some organizations are designed to seek neither profits nor losses
(e.g., churches, voluntary associations, government, state-supported universities, and community self-help organizations). Regardless of their diverse goals, they must acquire resources.
In the acquisition of resources, as well as in other activities, nonprofit organizations do engage
in economic activity encompassing the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of
goods and services. While necessary resources and other activities may not themselves be
viewed as profits or mechanisms for obtaining profits, these organizations must maximize returns in order to exist.
Organizations operating in the illegitimate economic order: The organized crime enterprise
engages in business activities that extend into both the legitimate and illegitimate economic
orders. See J. KWITNY, VICIOUS CIRCLES (1979). In both instances, organizational survival
depends on the ability to maximize returns. Though the means used to seek profits may consistently be illegitimate, these organizations certainly engage in competition for economic success. The case of organized crime raises an interesting point for speculation. While the origins
of organized crime may be attributed in part to blocked access to legitimate means, see
Cloward, Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and .Deviant Behavior, 24 AM. Soc. Rev. 164 (1959), the
continued use of unlawful behavior may call for a different explanation. One principle behind
organized crime is that illegitimate means become institutionalized. Some organizations
within the organized crime enterprise, therefore, may never find legitimate means blocked
because once illegitimate means are institutionalized, legitimate means are abandoned. The
continuation of unlawful behavior, then, may be better explained by blocked access to goals.
But if one can assume that organized crime organizations are characterized by normative solidarity supporting use of illegitimate means to attain goals, these mechanisms may operate
regardless of resource scarcity.
34. Other unlawful organizational behavior that clearly does not fit within the conceptual
scheme developed here includes conspiring to overthrow the government and the deprivation
of members' liberty or lives by religious organizations. See Sherman, Three Models oJ Organizational Corruption in Agencies oJSocial Control, 27 Soc. PROBS. 478 (1980).
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for continued existence35 suggests that the model developed here is
generally valid.
While no explanation has yet been found that encompasses all
forms of organizational misconduct, the structural factors suggested
in this part appear to apply to many instances of unlawful organizational behavior.36 Admittedly, no single paradigm can serve as a
tool for investigating the entire range of intriguing questions concerning organizational misconduct. A psychological explanation, for
example, may provide acceptable answers to some questions.37
Nonetheless, thinking about organizations in terms of structural
pressures to engage in unlawful behavior explains a good deal of
what is known and surmised about the phenomenon in question.
The extent to which the fit is true, though, must be verified
empirically.
II.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT

While the social structure may produce tensions for organizations to seek desired resources by illegal methods, unlawful behavior
cannot be explained by these structural tensions alone. Opportunities must be available to obtain resources unlawfully.38 Opportunities to attain resources unlawfully but through legitimate
me9hanisms are inherent in all complex organizations operating in
the legitimate economic order because of the nature of organizational processes and structure. Created for the purpose of conducting legitimate business activity, these same factors may also
35. See F. SCHERER, supra note 8, at 38. For discussions of the methodologically based
controversy on the diverse goals of organizations, see R. HALL, ORGANIZATIONS 94-96 (1972);
Perrow, The Analysis ofGoals in Complex Organizations, 26 AM. Soc. REv. 854, 859-66 (1961).
36. See, e.g., C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 35-69 (1975); Geis, supra note 21; Gross,
Organizational Crime: A Theoretical Perspective, in STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 55
(N. Denzin ed. 1978); Staw & Szwajkowski, supra note 1; Vaughan, Crime Between Organizations: Implicationsfar Victimology, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 77 (G. Geis & E. Stotland eds.
1980); D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4.
37. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 393-400, for an explanation of organizational unlawfulness which stresses the interrelation between psychological and siructural influences. Discussing the pressures on middle-level managers, Professor Coffee observed:
The middle manager is acutely aware that he can be easily replaced; he knows that if he
cannot achieve a quick fix, another manager is waiting in the wings, ea~er to assume
operational control over a division. The results of such a structure are predictable: When
pressure is intensified, illegal or irresponsible means become attractive to a desperate middle manager who has no recourse against a stem but myopic notion of accountability that
looks only to the bottom line of the income statement.
Id at 398. See E. SHORRIS, THE OPPRESSED MIDDLE: THE POLITICS OF MIDDLE MANAGE·
MENT (1981); Getschow, Overdriven Execs: Some Middle Managers Cut Comers to Achieve
High Corporate Goals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1979, at 1, col 6; Editorial, Why Managers Cheat,
Bus. WEEK, Mar. 17, 1980, at 196.
38. See R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, supra note 16.
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promote unlawful behavior by providing normative support for illegality, providing resources for carrying out illegal acts, and minimizing the risk of detection and sanctioning. As a consequence,
organizations may respond to blocked access to desired resources by
turning to the opportunities within their own boundaries to attain
them unlawfully.
Organizational characteristics have frequently been hypothesized
to encourage unlawful organizational behavior.39 The factors examined have included firm longevity, product diversification,
:financial performance, geographic expansion, market power, and
size.40 What these characteristics have in common is that they are
researchable - this information is publicly available, through
corporate :financial statements and mandatory agency filing requirements. But, other organizational characteristics - processes and
structure that are internal and, therefore, more elusive for research
purposes - play an important role in the unlawful conduct of business firms and may complicate the :findings concerning those factors
that have been studied. Organizational size, for example, has been
the most frequently investigated factor thought to be related to violations that are committed by one organization against another. 41 The
larger" the organization, it has been hypothesized, the more frequent
the violations. The evidence, however, has been contradictory. Perhaps a more satisfactory hypothesis is that it is not simply size per se
that facilitates the unlawful conduct, but the complexity of the internal processes and structure that accompany increased size that explains the behavior.42
This Part examines how structure and processes create opportunities for organizations to act as offenders. Before turning to this
topic, I want to make three points. First, these same factors create an
arena where individuals may readily engage in misconduct that is in
their own interests, separate and distinct from the interest of the organization. Second, the opportunities inherent in business firms not
only create the potential for an organization to engage in unlawful
conduct, but also promote the possibility that an organization will be
victimized - by other organizations as well as by its own members.
39. See, e.g., C. STONE, supra note 36; Gross, supra note 36.
40. See, e.g., M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980); Perez, Corporate
Criminality: A Study of the One-Thousand Largest Industrial Corporations in the U.S.A.
(1978) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania).
41. See, e.g., M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER,Stlpra note 40; M. CLINARD, P. YEAGER, J. BRISSETTE, D. PETRASHEK & E. HARRIEs, supra note l; Asch & Seneca, supra note l; Perez, supra
note 40.
42. Though not addressing organizational misconduct, R. HALL, supra note 35, at 171, also
states that complexity may be more important than size alone in understanding organizational
behavior.
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Finally, although these same opportunities exist in general form for
all organizations, the conditions and combinations of factors that do
or do not result in unlawful behavior cannot yet be unraveled. They
cannot, therefore, be discussed in the language of causality, but
rather as factors that facilitate, generate, encourage, or present opportunities to obtain resources through unlawf~l conduct.
A.

Organizational Processes

Processes are the dynamics of organizational life that affect individual members. While introducing the notion of organizations as
actors is legitimate and effectively accounts for certain actions, organizations must rely on individuals to act as their agents. To describe
properly the behavior - lawful or unlawful - of organizations,
therefore, we need an explanation that goes beyond the goals and
actions of the organization to the nexus of the goals and actions of
the organization and the goals and actions of its members. 43 This
necessity draws attention to the internal processes of organizations
and to the normative environment that results.
It is common knowledge that organizations selectively recruit
new members who in many ways match those already there. But individuals come to business firms influenced by their affiliations with
other organizations: families, churches, clubs, schools, trade unions,
and previous employers. Because business firms depend on their
members to attain goals, they must ensure that members' skills,
motivations, and values are consistent with the organization's needs.
To the extent that members subscribe to, support, and are willing
and able to pursue organizational interests, the firm's chances for
survival are enhanced.
The existence of these important characteristics of members is,
not surprisingly, rarely left to chance. As Selznick has noted, "the
more esoteric the activities of the organization, the less it can rely on
the general education provided by the community, and the greater
the need for internal orientation."44 Most organizations, therefore,
subject new recruits to education and training. Skills are taught,
sharpened, and adjusted to meet organizational needs through both
formal and informal mechanisms: training classes, apprenticeships,
peer groups, and mentoring. Integral to the mechanisms operating to
43. Coleman, Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses ofPower, in THE IDEA
supra note 22, at 221, 234-35.
44. P. SELZNICK, THE ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPON 36 (1960).

TURE,

OF SOCIAL STRUC-

1390

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 80:1377

develop these skills are systematic socialization processes that attune
members ideologically to the organization's goals.
Educational and training programs are supplemented, and perhaps eventually superseded, by an internal reward system incorporating both remuneration. and prestige. The rewards are often
formal, tangible, and obvious to other employees and even outsiders:
promotion, bonuses, salary increases, profit-sharing, parking privileges, expense accounts, gold watches, company cars, employee-ofthe-month awards, attractive offices, and assistants. In other cases,
the rewards are informal and not so obvious, but are powerful incentives, especially in the upper echelon, because of their long-term impact on a career. Use of first names, inclusion in after-hours gettogethers with management officials, or an invitation to play golf
with the boss reward the employee with admission to the informal
organization of the firm. Behavior inconsistent with organizational
goals typically leads to negative sanctions. These, too, can be formal
- loss of parking privileges, a lateral transfer, or a shift to a deadend position -· or informal - exclusion from the boss's golfing
clique. The ultimate sanction,. of course, is a resignation or firing.
Large organizations, moreover, tend increasingly to absorb members, while at the same time insulating them from the outside
world.45 Skills and language for a particular task may be so specialized that an employee cannot find similar work in other organizations. Members with no alternative skills are tied to the firm by
financial dependence. Accumulated retirement benefits and delayed
remuneration also encourage long-term commitments to organizations. Profit-sharing not only encourages long-term commitments,
but gives the individual a stake in the system. The luster of future
financial rewards binds members to the organization like a pair of
golden handcuffs, securing their continued affiliation with the firm.
And recreational activities, committee work, company cafeterias and
corporate dining rooms, long hours, special projects, and frequent
transfers separate an organization's members from the outside community and foster a dependence on the organization that is social, as
well as financial.
In these and other ways, the needs of the individual member
eventually become linked to the organization's success. Because a
primary criterion of individuals' status in highly modernized societies is the social status of the organizations to which they belong,46
45. D. MARGOLIS, THE MANAGERS: CORPORATE LIFE IN AMERICA 41-66, 93-116 (1979).
46. See Stinchcombe, supra note 17, at 164-80.
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the individual identifies with the organization and the organization's
goals. The organization's ability to attain desired resources affects
the ability of members to be upwardly mobile, to improve their economic position while remaining in the same social class, or simply to
preserve their existing position. Because the interests of members
and organizations coincide, employees may engage in unlawful behavior in the organization's behalf, using the skills, knowledge, and
resources associated with their position to do so.
Organizational processes, then, create an internal moral -and intellectual world in which the individual identifies with the organization and the organization's goals. The survival of one becomes
linked to the survival of the other, and a normative environment
evolves that, given difficulty in attaining organizational goals, encourages illegal behavior to attain those goals. But some finer distinctions must be made. Not all agents of an organization will act
illegally in the organization's behalf. The nature of the response lawful or unlawful behavior - will be shaped by structural factors
both internal and external to the organization.47 While organizations may experience structural tensions to violate, variation in
subunit membership,48 position in the information system,49 and in
rewards and punishments50 may undermine the organization's ability to unify the goals and actions of its members with its own goals
and actions, producing either deviance or conformity to legal
norms.51
Subunit membership. Tensions to attain resources unlawfully differentially affect the various parts of the organization. The subunits
with skills and resources most relevant to profit-seeking goals are
most likely to be affected. Because of the many and changing goals
of organizations, the subunits affected may vary over time, and some
may never _experience such tensions. Members of subunits not subject to these tensions will not be motivated to engage in illegal behavior in the organization's behalf.
Position in the information system. Though working in a subunit
that is experiencing tensions to act unlawfully, members without information about necessary resources and difficulties in attaining
them will not be motivated to act illegally in the organization's behalf. For unlawful behavior" to occur, the member's position must
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 17-23.
Id
Id
See Lemert, supra note 5, at 70-73; Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 17-18.
Lemert, supra note 5, at 73-75.
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provide access to information regarding the organization's goals as
they relate to the activities of the subunit in which the member is
employed. The position, mor_eover, must entail some responsibility
for goal attainment. Finally, the position must provide skills and
resources that allow the individual to resolve the organization's
difficulties. 52
Rewards andpunishments. Even if subunit membership and position in the information system create tensions to engage in unlawful
behavior in the organization's behalf, members thus situated may
not do so. Norms and values learned through association with other
organizations (both formal and informal) may compete with and
contradict those learned while in the firm. 53 Should the norms be
contradictory, members will make choices in accordance with the rewards and punishments accompanying the various alternatives. 54
Members will weigh the possibility of gaining rewards against the
possibility of incurring punishment.
As the rewards and punishments accompanying the alternatives
vary, the patterns of individual choice will vary. 55 Should the firm's
rewards for gaining the desired resources outweigh the perceived
costs of pursuing them unlawfully, members may commit violations
on behalf of the organization despite competing norms. Again, position in the information system is relevant, for information flows affect the probability that rewards and punishments - both internal
and external to the organization-will be meted out. 56 The significance of the organization's rewards and punishments, moreover, will
vary as the individual's dependence on the firm varies. Alternative
skills, alternative sources of income, and alternative validating social
roles reduce financial and social dependence on the firm. 57 Consequently, external rewards and punishments may reduce the organization's ability to mobilize individual efforts in its behalf, despite
processes that produce a normative environment supporting unlawful conduct.
Although all organizations create normative environments that
join the goals and actions of members to those of the firm, to assert
that organizational processes produce a fertile atmosphere for ille52. See note 37 supra.
53. Lemert, supra note 5, at 62-71.
54. Id. at 70-73; Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 17.
55. As Lemert has noted, "(c]osts are important variables in analysis because changes in
the costs of means can modify the order of choices, even though the 'ideal' value order of the
individual remains constant." Lemert, supra note 5, at 63.
56. Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 21.
57. P. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 119-25, 140-42 (1964).
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gality obscures the complexity that exists. The degree to which an
organization experiences pressures to act unlawfully varies not only
by subunit, but within subunits, and over time. The ability and willingness of members to act illegally in the organization's behalf depend on the subunit in which they work, their position in the
information system, and the weighing of rewards and punishments.
These factors may not only ·generate lawful conduct in the face of
organizational pressures to violate, but may generate unlawful conduct despite a normative environment that supports compliance with
legal norms. It is important to recognize, therefore, that the normative environment generated by organizational processes will have a
variable relationship to unlawful conduct, and that the problem of
measurement remains a powerful obstacle to a complete understanding of the relationship between internal environment and behavior.
B.

Organizational Structure

The structure of complex organizations creates opportunities by
providing many settings where unlawful behavior might occur, and
by isolating those settings and masking organizational behavior.
Size and the complexity that frequently accompanies size provide
many locations in which unlawful behavior might take place. As
organizations grow larger, specialized subunits result, each providing
opportunities to engage in unlawful behavior on the organization's
behalf. Not only are organizations internally diversified in ways that
multiply the possible settings for illegality, but many organizations
are geographically dispersed, with locations throughout the United
States and the world, greatly expanding the number of locations in
which unlawful behavior might occur.
These specialized subunits compete for resources with other or.:
ganizations and with each other.58 The need for a subunit to outperform other organizations, other units within the same
organization, or even its own- previous record to secure resources
from the parent organization may generate illegality, such as falsification of records, or theft of trade secrets. Sµbunits' concerns about
their own survival may or may not coincide with the interest of the
larger organization, and if given an opportunity to exercise discretion, lower-level managers will tend to act not to maximize the firm's
58. For a dramatic example of intra-organizational competition, see Coffee, Beyond the
Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal
Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1135 (1977) (reporting a case where ''two wholly owned subsidiaries of U.S. Steel ••. actively lobbied with regard to proposed legislation, but on opposite
sides") (emphasis in original).
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welfare, but rather to enhance the interest of their own unit or division.59 In a recent book on the internal workings of General Motors,
for example, the corporation's continual competition with the Ford
Motor Company bears striking similarities. to the description of the
rivalry between two divisions of General Motors, Chevrolet and
Pontiac, as well as to the adversarial relationship between the divisions of the company and their respective dealers. 60
Specialization not only generates opportunities for unlawful behavior by increasing the locations where it might occur, but also by
obscuring organizational behavior, lawful and unlawful. Task segregation cloaks activities. No one individual or group can command
all the knowledge pertaining to particular operations, materials, or
technology. 61 This serves a protective function for the organization,
increasing its ability to survive despite information leakage or personnel turnover. 62 The secrecy generated by task segregation, however, also creates the opportunity for misconduct. Specialization
creates problems of coordination and control. Consequently, organizations develop rules and procedures to handle the various internal
contingencies the organization faces by specifying how, when, and
by whom tasks are to be performed.63 The rules and procedures are
expressed in a language common to all subunits of an organization,
symbolically integrating the various parts. They seek not only to
control and coordinate activities, but also to facilitate the systematic
exchange of information that is necessary for decision-making.
Though directed toward "integrating the separate parts of the organization, the potential for rules and procedures to achieve internal
coordination and control varies considerably. Progressive loss of
control over subunits seems to be a natural consequence of organizational growth. Structure interferes with.the efforts of those at the top
to ''know'' the behavior of the diverse parts by obscuring activity at
other levels.64 As the organization grows, and as the distance be59. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETs AND HIERARCHIES 125 (1975); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPO·
RATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 47-52 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE CON·
TROL]; Coffee, supra note 58, . at 1135-36; Perrow, The Analysis of Goals in Complex
Organizations, 26 AM. Soc. Rev. 854 (1961).
60. J. WRIGHT, ON A CLEAR DAY You CAN SEE GENERAL MOTORS 73-97 (1979).
61. Technology is used here to encompass operations technology, materials technology,
and knowledge technology. See Hickson, Pugh & Pheysey, Operations Technology and Organization Structure: An Empirical Reappraisal, 14 Ao. SCI. Q. 378 (1969).
62. See D. NELSON, MANAGERS AND WORKERS (1975).
63. See R. HALL, supra note 35, at 173, 196.
64. See Gouldner, Reciprocity and Autonom;, in Functional Theory, in SYMPOSIUM ON SoCIOLOGICAL THEORY 241 (L. Gross ed. 1959); Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely
Coupled Systems, 21 AD. SCI. Q. I (1976).
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tween subordinate units and those at the top likewise grows, "authority leakage,' develops. 65 Authority leakage conveys an image of
an organization that has, by reason of increased size, hierarchical
authority system, and specialization, become so unwieldy that the
upper levels cannot control the subunits. The organization, in short,
can diversify beyond the capability of those at the top to master it.
Authority leakage allows an organizational subunit - a subsidiary, the accounting division, or the research and development
branch, for example - to engage in a fraudulent transaction with
another organization and ensures that no countervailing intra-organizational authority can prevent or control the unlawful behavior.
Specialized knowledge further complicates this problem. In an organization with highly specialized subunits, one may lack the expertise to detect ongoing violations in another. Interestingly, subgoal
pursuit and authority leakage may also lead to compliance with legal
standards in the face of organization pressures to violate. Nevertheless, these characteristics also should be considered as factors that
may generate opportunities for violation.
Implicit in the concept of authority leakage is that an organization should be able to control its subunits. It might be thought,
therefore, that authority leakage could occur only when an organization is operating irrationallY. or ineffectually, and that if a 'firm were
operating in best form, information would flow smoothly (and accurately) from bottom to top and vice versa, maximiziDB the possibility
of control. This notion is contradicted by both research and theory.66 The result that may in some cases be described as inefficient
or irrational behavior may thus in others be the rational institutionalization of systematic censorship procedures by those controlling
the flow of information.67
65. Studying governmental bureaucracies in the 1960's, Gordon Tullock observed the
phenomenon of "authority leakage." He described this as a progressive loss of control
over subordinate units within the same bureaucracy as the organization expanded and the
distance between such units and those at the agency's top became greater. Subsequently,
another student of bureaucracies, Anthony Downs, formalized Tullock's perception into a
general law, the "Law of Diminishing Control," which states: "The larger any organization becomes, the weaker is the control over its actions exercised by those at the top."
Both Downs and Tullock found one underlying cause of this progressive p!lfalysis to be
the ease with which generalized orders and nonspecific policies impo~ed at the top could
be successively reinterpreted, distorted, or qualified as the commands filtered downward
through the organization.
Coffee, supra note 58, at 1136-37 (footnotes omitted). See A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY
143 (1966); CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 59, at 26; G. TULLOCK, THE PoLmcs OF BUREAUCRACY 142-93 (1965).
66. See J. EMERY, ORGANIZATIONAL PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 24-48 (1969);
Coffee, supra note 58, at 1137-39.
61. See K. ARRow, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 73-75 (1974); C. STONE, supra note 36,
at 43-44; CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 59, at 22, 25-26; Coffee, supra note 58, at 1134-47.
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While authority leakage is a consequence of structure that focuses attention on the inability of those at the top to control the organizational bureaucracy, systematic censorship procedures can
originate at any point in the hierarchy and mask behavior throughout the organization. Units at the top may thus be encouraged to
engage in unlawful conduct not only by their structural isolation, but
also by systematic censorship of information that obscures misconduct from others. Furthermore, the hierarchical authority structure
diffuses personal responsibility for decision-making throughout the
organization. Determining where within an organization a decision
was made is diffi.cult.68 As a result, "[t]he delegation of responsibility and unwritten orders keep those at the top of the corporate structure remote from the consequences of their decisions and orders,
much as the heads of organized- crime families remain 'untouchable'
by the law." 69
Ill.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT

Economic success, competition for scarce resources, norm erosion: and organizational structure and processes provide some insight into how unlawful organizational behavior may be
systematically produced by the social structure. Not all organizations will respond with unlawful conduct,70 but the structural origins
of misconduct have some interesting implications for social control.
Many scholars and activists have suggested increasing agency resources to better control unlawful organizational behavior. This suggestion is directed toward strengthening not only sanctions and
surveillance, but the laws and regulations that undergird the use of
these technologies. Some suggest, for example, that unlawful organizational behavior be met with sanctions more appropriate to corporate actors: statutes that impose both organizational criminal
Coffee points to the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, which "simply states the much-observed
phenomenon that recipients of information unconsciously focus on and relay only the infor•
mation that reinforces their preexisting attitudes, while filtering out conflicting information."
Id at 1137. See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); M. ROKEACH,
THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND (1960). For more recent revisions of this theory, see I. JANIS &
L. MANN, DECISION MAKING 15-16, 82-85, 420 n.3 (1977).
68. For an extended discussion of how this organizational characteristic relates to legal
issues of responsibility for organizational behavior, see C. STONE, supra note 36, at 60-69.
69. J. CONKLIN, "ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL" 65 (1977).
70. See Lemert, supra note 5, at 68. Moreover, "[t]he fact that deviance fails to occur
under these conditions (and occurs when they are absent) merely suggests that structural strain
is not a necessary and sufficient cause of deviance. To deny the relation between deviance and
anomie on these grounds would be like arguing that hunger is not causally related to eating
because people sometimes eat when they are not and refrain from eating when they are."
Ewick, Memorandum, Feb. 1981 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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liability and personal liability for organizational conduct; statutes
that more accurately describe organizational violations; greater penalties; prison sentences for corporate executives; federal chartering of
organizations; variable fines based on gross sales rather than fixed
amounts; licensing of businessmen so that those licenses can be revoked; and elimination of "no contest" pleas.71 Recommendations
for strengthening surveillance technologies include, for example, increasing the skills, knowledge, and numbers of agency personnel,
creating laws that require disclosure of certain information on corporate activities, public representation on boards of directors, and mixing agency monitoring strategies to vary the· timing of surveillance
for an organization.72
Any consideration of policies aimed at increasing agency resources should be grounded in realistic expectations for effectiveness.
Despite increased resources, all social control efforts encounter natural constraints because of the ways in which the social structure continuously and systematically generates unlawful organizational
behavior. Consequently, while increasing resources to strengthen
surveillance and sanctioning capabilities may result in greater efficiency and effectiveness in a particular case, the social structure perpetuates the phenomenon. For business firms, profit-maximization is
a central activity and scarcity will always be a factor. The structure
of business organizations, their internal environments and the complexity of their daily transactions73 are aspects of modem life that
provide suitable opportunities for illegality.
The autonomy and interdependence of agencies and the firms
they regulate, moreover, will predictably mitigate social control effoi;ts by increasing the probability that the firms' rewards for gaining
resources will outweigh the perceived cost of pursuing them unlawfully, thus contributing to misconduct.74 The autonomy of corporate
actors is protected by structure and the nature of business transactions, as well as by notions of privacy, all of which present barriers to
surveillance of organizational behavior. Specialization reinforces
this protective barrier by requiring agencies to possess highly technical knowledge concerning specific industries, organizations, and of11. See M. CLINAfU), P. YEAGER, 1. BRISSETTE, D. PETRASHEK & E. HARRIES, supra note .
l; J. CONKLIN, supra note 69; R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION (1976); C. STONE, supra note 36; Geis, supra note 21.
72. See M. Ermann & R. Lundman, supra note l; R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGJ.\1AN,
supra note 71; C. STONE SUJJra note 36.
73. See Vaughan, Transaction Systems and Unlaeful Organizational Behavior, 29 Soc.
PROBS. (1982).
14. See D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at ch. 6; note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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fenses to carry out their mandates. And the interdependence of
government agencies and business firms critically affects the creation
and use of sanctioning technologies. Possession of a resource critical
to an exchange affects the behavior of the resource-dependent organization,75 and when the government is dependent upon a firm for
some commodity or service, the probability of vigorous enforcement
is decreased. 76 Business firms and agencies frequently compromise,
both in the creation and application of laws and regulations, for negotiation requires fewer resources from both than adversarial strategies. Resource exchanges between agencies and business firms also
influence the effectiveness of restraints. Despite increased resources
devoted to social control, therefore, organizational misconduct appears to be a natural accompaniment to the complexity of business
organizations and their interactions that will continue as long as the
structure of opportunity and organizational goals remains the same.
It is important to recognize, finally, that laws and regulations,
surveillance, and sanctioning may themselves be related to unlawful
behavior. Increasing these resources to strengthen agency capabilities may have the unintended effect of increasing real rates of unlawful business conduct, even after accounting for increases from
greater enforcement activity.77 This· possibility is created in a
number of ways.
First, the laws and regulations that prescribe and proscribe the
behavior of business organizations are a major resource of social
control agencies. Certain characteristics of these rules may be related to patterns of violations. For example:
(1) Number: A proliferation of guidelines related to a particular
industry, task, or exchange may defy mastery, or result in some regulations being selectively ignored. Large numbers of laws and rules
moreover, create monitoring difficulties, which reduce the risk of detection and sanctioning.
(2) Recency: The date of origin may affect the legitimacy of a
law or regulation, knowledge of its existence, or the degree to which
it has been tested or officially interpreted. These factors may influence willingness to conform or deviate. 78
(3) Relevance: The degree to which a law or regulation is rele75. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note I, at 51.
76. D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at ch. 6.
77. See Marx, Ironies of Social Control· Authorities as Contributors lo Deviance Through
Escalation, Noneeforcement, and Covert Facilitation, 28 Soc. PRODS. 222 (1981).
78. Ewick, Theories of Organizational Illegality: A Reconceptualization, 2 YALB WORKING
PAPER SERIES 12 (1981).
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vant to a particular task or the larger purpos(?s of the organization
may influence willingness to abide by it.79
(4) Complexity: A law or rule having many interrelated parts or
elements may be difficult to interpret, generating unlawful conduct
out of misunderstanding.
. (5) Vagueness: A law or regulation that is stated in general or
indefinite terms, or that is not clearly expressed may result in
misconduct.
·
(6) Acceptability: Acceptability of a rule or a law may be influenced by substantive focus, cost of adherence in terms of time, personnel, and equipment, existence and strength of sanctions invoked
for violation, predictability of enforcement, or any of the preceding
five characteristics. so
Second, the surveillance technologies of social control agencies
- monitoring and investigating the behavior of business :firms may also be related to unlawful conduct. Surveillance subjects an
organization to accountability. "[T]o hold an organization accountable is to set up norms or criteria by which its success in goal-attainment is judged."81 Not only may this intensify pressures to attain
goals, creating tensions to attain them unlawfully, but organizations
may respond to the surveillance by falsifying the performance indicators being monitored. Surveillance also imposes costs on organizations. Filing, reporting, and_ inspection requirements for
organizations demand resources that could be directed toward profit.maximization or related goals. In the event that surveillance imposes costs on organizations that interfere with other survival strategies, it may produce tensions to attain · necessary resources

unlawfully.
Third, sanctions that interfere with the attainment of organizational goals may opera!e similarly. Many sanctions seek to punish
organizational misconduct by affecting profits. A business :firm that
incurs handicaps to its profit-making capabilities due to sanctions
imposed may continue to operate with goals altered to match the
reduced performance capacity, or may try to maintain its position in
the competition with reduced resources. In the latter situation, firms
may experience pressures to engage in unlawful conduct to attain
goals.
The cost of surveillance and sanctioning will, of course, have va79. See A. COHEN, DEVIANCE AND CONTROL 6 (1966); R. HALL, supra note 35, at 173-77.
80. A. COHEN, supra note 79, at 16-21.
81. Gross, supra-note 36, at 63.
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riable impact on organizations. 82 When costs are in proportion to
sales or output, the impact will be the same across organizations.
When costs are fixed, however, some organizations will have greater
difficulty absorbing them than others. Firms not experiencing economic strain and possessing resources to adapt to regulatory strategies may escape the additional competi_tive pressures the social
control efforts are likely to generate. Firms operating under uncertainty are more vulnerable. While all firms at times may face uncertain conditions, large and wealthy corporations can draw on greater
resources should this be the case. The costs of surveillance and sanctioning technologies are thus likely to have a greater impact on
small, new, or struggling firms than on large, established firms that
can afford to be regulated. The greater the cost relative to net income, the greater the probability of subsequent pressures to attain
resources unlawfully.
Fourth, while surveillance and sanctioning may impose costs on
business firms that precipitate misconduct in exchanges with other
organizations acting as suppliers, competitors, and consumers, the
threat of agency interference with business operations may initiate
unlawful conduct between businesses and the social control organizations. To protect organizational resources, bribery may occur to
ensure licensing, inspection, or contract relations that are in the
firm's best interest. 83
In a number of ways, therefore, the threat and application of surveillance and sanctioning technologies that increase corporate expenditures relative to net costs may produce illegality. While
strengthening the resources of agencies may result in greater efficiency and effectiveness in a particular case, in the aggregate greater
regulatory resources may be accompanied by a- rise in the rate of
misconduct, in spite of the manifest purposes for which these tools
are created. In his research on nuclear accidents, for example, Perrow concluded that better regulation is hard to achieve without increasing costs and risking further accidents because of imposed
complexity. 84 This statement also may hold for organizational illegality. Because misconduct appears to be a function of the complexity of organizations, their interactions, and the structures in which
82. See Zald,-On the Social Control ofIndustries, 57 Soc. FORCES 79, 85 (1978).
83. A. BIDERMAN & A. REISS, DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA FOR A SELECTION OF PROSPECTIVE FEDERAL SOURCES OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME DATA 37-38 (1979) (National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration).
84. Wolf, 17ze Accident. at 17zree Mile Island: Social Science Perspectives, Soc. Set. RESEARCH COUNCIL BULL. 33, 58-59 (1979).
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they operate, a logical extension is that strengthening the resources
of social control agencies will increase the complexity of the regulatory apparatus and thereby increase the possibility of structurally
produced tensions and opportunities for misconduct. This possibility underscores the importance of distinguishing between tactics that
increase the level of surveillance and the likelihood of apprehending
and sanctioning and tactics that will change the corporate environment in ways that will reduce the incidence of unlawful behavior.
If unlawful organizational behavior is systematically produced
by the social structure, if firms and agencies negotiate a regulatory
environment that inhibits the imposition of costs for violative behavior, and if efforts to control violations may have the unintended effect of encouraging them, what remains to be said concerning the
social control of organizations? Does this mean that social control
efforts are to no avail and should be abandoned because they only
succeed in stimulating rates of corporate misconduct? While such a
policy of radical nonintervention85 may indeed reduce the system's
complexity and thus alleviate tensions to engage in unlawful conduct, agencies' ability to regulate specific corporate behaviors should
not be overlooked. 86 Any conclusions about nonintervention, therefore, are unjustifiable without an accounting of the aggregate monetary and social costs and benefits of social control and of how those
costs and benefits are distributed. 87
Some of these are difficult to assess. Recognition that unlawful
business conduct is a natural accompaniment of modem life, for example, should neither obfuscate nor deny the issue of moral responsibility in the individual case. Beyond the question of effectiveness
and efficiency, investing resources in the social control of organizations may serve an important societal function by challenging the
notion of corporations as elite entities beyond the law. Another issue
is deterrence; little is known about deterrence and corporate actors.
While it may be true that an accounting of aggregate costs and benefits of social control and their distribution is impractical or even impossible, policy should not be structured to preclude the possibility
that such benefits may occur.
. Rather than a nonintervention stance reflecting the negative implications that structural constraints pose for the control of unlawful
8S. See E. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION (1973).
86. See D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
87. See Barnett, Corporate Capitalism, Corporate Crime 13-14 (Paper presented at Conference on White Collar and Economic Crime, Potsdam, N.Y., Feb. 7-9, 1980) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
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organizational behavior, an understanding of these constraints can
offer some guidelines for positive remedies addressing the structural
origins of organizational misconduct. Of the generating factors discussed, the least addressed by scholars and activists, yet perhaps the
most vulnerable to manipulation by social control agencies, are the
activities of agencies themselves. 88 Agencies engage in exchange
with business .firms and establish the guidelines for transactions between private enterprise organizations. In addition to their mandated surveillance activities, agencies can guard against the
possibility that these regulatory efforts may generate unlawful conduct. The simplification of reporting and filing requirements for
firms, for example, and attention to the characteristics of law and
regulations that may generate violations are positive directions that
agency self-surveillance might talce.

88. One exception is the .work of Gerhart, who analyzes the variables that influence the
length of antitrust cases and evaluates techniques that have been or might be used to expedite
antitrust litigation. See P. G!;RHART, 2 REPORT OF THE EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES PROJECT TO
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION EOR THE REvlE.W OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES (1979).

